Public Law: Adminstrative Procedure by Dakin, Melvin G.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 25 | Number 2
Symposium Issue: The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1963-1964 Term
February 1965
Public Law: Adminstrative Procedure
Melvin G. Dakin
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Melvin G. Dakin, Public Law: Adminstrative Procedure, 25 La. L. Rev. (1965)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol25/iss2/15
PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
Melvin G. Dakin*
FAIR HEARINGS
In Fitzgerald v. Davis,' the Fourth Circuit had occasion to
consider the hearing rights of a river pilot after the revocation
of his pilot's license. Actual revocation power is vested in the
Governor under the statute but before he may exercise such
power he must refer the matter to a board of commissioners
"which shall sit as investigators and report their findings to the
governor, recommending, if justified, a penalty."'2 The pilot was
duly notified by letter that the commissioners proposed to con-
duct an investigation and hearing, and two specific accidents
were alluded to as putting the pilot's competency in issue. The
letter also stated that "the hearing will include ... previous ac-
cidents insofar as they might touch upon your competency as a
pilot." At the hearing, five specific accidents in which the pilot
was involved were discussed and the pilot was also informed that
he had been barred from one shipowner's ships. Written inter-
rogatories were propounded for one accident, and the hearing
was recessed to permit preparation of pilot's answers on the
matter. Two additional meetings were held at which pilot was
present with his counsel and at the last meeting the pilot was
informed that a report would be made to the Governor. The
possibility that the Governor might order the calling of a formal
hearing "if he felt one was warranted" was alluded to. The pro-
posed report was actually made a recommendation that the
pilot's license be revoked in view of an additional accident in
which he was later involved. The commissioners found that the
pilot was "completely incompetent" on the basis of the five acci-
dents on which evidence had been considered and which'were
found to have been caused by the pilot's lack of skill and poor
judgment.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 160 So. 2d 345 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
2. LA. R.S. 34:1049 (1950).
3. 160 So. 2d at 347.
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Against this background, the pilot complained that, since no
"formal hearing" was held, he was deprived of due process of
law. The court held that no formal hearing was required by the
statute and that the commissioners had fully satisfied the statu-
tory requirements. It rejected the constitutional argument on
the ground that the pilot's license was a privilege and not a
property right or interest, hence outside the protection of the
due process clause. 4 Inasmuch as the pilot was accompanied by
counsel and presumably had full opportunity to develop his de-
fense, it might have been plausibly held that the hearing ac-
corded him satisfied due process requirements. Since, however,
he may not have had full opportunity to test all evidence against
him by the judicial safeguards of cross-examination of sworn
witnesses, a "formal" or judicial hearing might arguably have
changed the result. Where, as here, credibility was evidently
not a factor, could not a "fair" hearing be said to have been ac-
corded within the due process clause? To have said so would
have eliminated the need to characterize the interest involved
as a "privilege" revocable, if the legislature chose, at the mere
inclination of the Governor. 5
When the St. Tammany Parish Police Jury were authorized
to create a charity hospital, the local act of the legislature con-
tained the relatively unusual provision that the board of com-
missioners to be designated by the police jurors should appoint
a medical staff but that "such appointments shall be made upon
the recommendation of the physicians who are authorized to
practice within the hospital." This provision has now been in-
terpreted, in Giles v. Breaux,7 to place upon the board the man-
datory obligation to appoint any physician recommended for
appointment by the medical staff but is held not to affect "the
inherent authority of the Board to suspend or revoke staff privi-
leges of any physician ... whose professional qualifications are
such as to render him not competent." (Emphasis added.)
4. Id. at 349-50.
5. During the term, the Fourth Circuit had before it another river pilot case
involving the issue of fair hearing. However, this involved suspension of mem-
bership in the river pilots' association rather than revocation of the state license.
to work as a pilot; since this was membership in a private association, the court
refused to interfere absent a showing of conduct not in accord with the charter
and by-laws. Heuer v. Crescent River Port Pilots' Ass'n, 158 So. 2d 221 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1963).
6. La. Acts 1950, No. 129, § 8.
7. 160 So. 2d 608 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
8. Id. at 615.
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The board had made no provision for revocation or suspen-
sion of the hospital privileges of a member of the medical staff
although the staff itself had adopted by-laws containing such a
provision. The board had vested operation of the two hospitals
created under the statute in operating committees drawn from
members of the board, but these operating committees had like-
wise made no provision for revocation or suspension of hospital
staff privileges.
In this state of affairs, the plaintiff physician in this case
applied for the required annual renewal of staff privileges to
the medical staff and, in accordance with its by-laws, the staff
met and approved the application subject to certain limitations
on surgical practice.9 Thereafter, the operating committee met
and without affording the plaintiff any notice of charges of pro-
fessional incompetency, or opportunity to answer them in hear-
ing, voted to deny him staff privileges and so notified him by
letter. Plaintiff brought an action in mandamus commanding
admission to staff privileges and obtained a temporary restrain-
ing order preserving his staff status pending hearing. Subse-
quent to filing of this suit, the full board met and again denied
the renewal of plaintiff's staff privileges, still without afford-
ing him an opportunity to be heard.10
The First Circuit held that the board was without power to
delegate to an operating committee its entire implied power to
revoke or suspend staff privileges as bestowed on it by the legis-
lature.,1 It further held that the board was without power,
under this unique Louisiana statute, to reject the recommenda-
tions of its medical staff on appointments and hence on the
granting of staff privileges.' 2 Finally, it held that the board
and its operating committee acted arbitrarily and capriciously
in suspending the physician's staff privileges as they did, with-
out affording notice of charges and opportunity to meet them.13
The court noted that the action was also discriminatory inas-
much as the actual alleged misconduct, consisting of the keep-
ing of inadequate hospital patient records, was apparently not
confined to this plaintiff. The First Circuit thoughtfully notes
that, if the board had lived up to its responsibilities, the whole
9. Id. at 613.
'10. ibid.
11. Id. at 614.
12. Id. at 615.
13. Id. at 618.
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matter "would probably have been settled within the walls of
the hospital rather than the walls of the court room." 14 Certain-
ly, the treatment of this plaintiff was something less than the
"due process of law" which members of the profession have the
right to expect from each other when they constitute themselves
into an administrative agency as well as when they go to court.
The First Circuit had- occasion to remind the Division of
Employment Security, in Jones v. Administrator,15 that a fair
hearing is not accorded an applicant where the notice of contest
charges one offense and the agency makes its determination of
disqualification on another offense not charged. Here, insubor-
dination had been charged but not proved, and, on administra-
tive appeal, the disqualification was affirmed by the Board of
Review on the different ground that applicant had left his em-
ployment without good cause.1" As to this finding, applicant
complained that he had been denied a fair hearing. 7 In order-
ing payment of benefits to applicant, the First Circuit noted that
" 'the findings of fact.., must be supported by evidence and by
that is meant legal and competent evidence. To that statement
of essential requirements must be added the basic prerequisite
to any finding, that of notice of the charge and an opportunity
to be heard thereon; otherwise, the parties are denied a reason-
able opportunity for a fair hearing as conferred by statute.' 0118
DELEGATION
In Louisiana State Board of Embalmers v. Britton,"9 the Su-
preme Court held that in the governing statute20 the legislature
had delegated to the board arbitrary power to grant or withhold
a license to prospective embalmers and that the statute was
hence unconstitutional in that it did not recognize the separation
of governmental powers. 2' Specifically, the statute vests power
in the board to issue a license if it finds "that the applicant pos-
sesses adequate knowledge of the science of embalming, sanita-
tion, and disinfection and meets the qualifications prescribed. '22
14. Id. at 617.
15. 154 So. 2d 54 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
16. Id. at 54-55.
17. Id. at 55.
18. Ibid.
19. 244 La. 756, 154 So. 2d 389 (1963).
20. LA. R.S. 37:840, 842 (Supp. 1963).
21. 244 La. at 763-64, 154 So. 2d at 391-92.
22. LA. R.S. 37:842B (Supp. 1958).
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This, said the court, could "only mean such knowledge as is
deemed adequate by the Board ' 23 and "provides no real stan-
dards or guides. '24 It will be interesting to see what is submit-
ted by way of amendment to cure the constitutional defect now
laid bare.
One Justice dissented and referred to a dissent in a prior
similar case in which he had been unable to find unconstitution-
ality in the powers delegated to the State Board of Examiners
in watchmaking. He there noted "' "the modern tendency is to
be more liberal in permitting grants of discretion to administra-
tive bodies ... in order to facilitate the administration of
laws." ' ,25 Davis, in his work on Administrative Law, notes that
the Maryland court quoted by the dissent went on to state that
"'where the discretion to be exercised relates to police regula-
tions for the protection of public morals, health, safety, or gen-
eral welfare, and it is impracticable to fix standards without de-
stroying the flexibility necessary to enable the administrative
officials to carry out the legislative will, legislation delegating
such discretion without restrictions may be valid.' "26 Assuming
our regulation of embalmers is a necessary health and safety
measure and not one designed surreptitiously to countenance
restraints of trade, it may be that we must rely on a large mea-
sure of discretion vested in the board to accomplish these objec-
tives. Protection against favoritism or other unfairness may
have to be accomplished in other ways.2T
PLEADINGS, FINDINGS AND ORDERS
Johns v. Jefferson Davis School Board28 provided an oppor-
tunity for the Third Circuit to review action taken by the school
board and to find that it failed to measure up to standards of
fair administrative procedure. The occasion was presented by
the dismissal of a tenured school teacher of almost thirty years
experience, seventeen of them as an elementary school principal,
23. 244 La. at 763, 154 So. 2d at 391.
24. Id. at 765, 154 So. 2d at 392.
25. Dissent, State v. Morrow, 231 La. 572, 582, 92 So. 2d 70, 74 (1956).
26. Pressman v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544, 555, 121 A.2d 816, '822 (1956) ; com-
mented on in 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 2.15, at 150-51 (1958).
27. 1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 2.15, at 151 (1958): "The ele-
ments of protection that may often be feasible include a hearing with a deteramina-
tion on the record, a requirement of findings and reasons, respect for consistency
of principle from one case to another, and opportunity -for check or supervision
either by administrative review or legislative review or judicial review."
28. 154 So. 2d 581 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
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for his inability to cope with a situation precipitated when his
school was expanded to high school status. The situation was
highly charged primarily because a student pregnancy was at-
tributed to inadequate supervision and discipline during school
hours. In this setting, Johns was charged with wilful neglect of
duty and incompetence on a number of counts and dismissed.2 9
The court thoroughly reviewed the record, finding most of
the charges explained away or unsustained by evidence except
for a proved inability to handle a high school situation.3 0 It also
found that evidence was taken by the board of alleged delin-
quencies beyond those charged at the outset which the teacher
had no opportunity to prepare against.3 ' As the court points
out, "if the board had rejected the unproven charges and those
based on improperly admitted evidence . . . [it is] uncertain
what, if any, disciplinary action the board might have taken. It
might ... simply have reprimanded the plaintiff; or, if it had
removed him, the 'removal' might have consisted of a demotion
or a transfer to some less favorable assignment, instead of an
outright dismissal from the school system. '3 2 The case was re-
manded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views
expressed. Such additional proceedings would, presumably, in-
sure adequate notice of the charges on which evidence is to be
heard, findings based on such evidence, and an order properly
attuned not only to what had been charged but to what had been
charged and proved.
FINDINGS
For the past several years, a federal employee has been eli-
gible for state unemployment compensation benefits if an appro-
priate federal-state agreement is in effect.3 3 However, under the
statute, there may be no redetermination in a state forum of
the validity of the findings made by a federal agency for termi-
nation of federal service.3 4 Thus, in Thompson v. Brown,3 5 plain-
tiff made application for benefits under Louisiana law, but his
claim was rejected because the circumstances surrounding his
separation from federal service constituted misconduct. On ap-
29. Id. at 583.
30. Id. at 587.
31. Ibid.
32. Id. at 588.
33. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1361, 1364 (1964).
34. Id. § 1367.
35. 157 So. 2d 239 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
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peal, plaintiff sought review of the determination and thus pre-
cipitated for the court the question of the scope of its review
under the federal statute. It interpreted the federal statute as
pretermitting a// inquiry into the conduct which gave rise to
termination of the federal service but as leaving open the issue
of whether the conduct for which he was dismissed constituted
misconduct under the Louisiana law.3 6 Since the conduct in
question consisted of falsifications on an application for a posi-
tion of trust in the federal service, the court found no error in
equating it with misconduct under the Louisiana statute, such
conduct having been held to include "'a deliberate violation of
the employer's rules, and a disregard of standards of behavior
which the employer has a right to expect of his employees.' "37
FINALITY OF ORDERS
In Chubb v. DeKeyzer,38 the Supreme Court reviewed admin-
istrative action taken under the Agricultural Adjustment Act
by a county committee and a statutory review committee, such
review, under the statute, being limited to questions of law.
Findings of fact by the agency, if supported by evidence, are
made conclusive.3 9 A rice grower, contemplating the sale of a
part of his farm, asked for an apportionment of his acreage al-
lotment under a regulation which provided for apportioning such
allotment "on the basis of the cropland normally considered as
available for and adapted to the production of the allotment
crops on each tract. '40 "Normally available" was initially inter-
preted so as to exclude cropland converted or intended to be
converted to other crops. 41 On the basis of this interpretation,
the entire allotment of the original farm was apportioned to the
tract sold and some steps were taken to convert the tract re-
tained to other uses.4 2 However, two years later the tract
retained was sold and the purchaser petitioned the county com-
mittee to reopen their apportionment and allocate the allotment
for rice growing on the basis of the cropland actually adapted
to rice growing at the time of the first sale. The county commit-
tee, in an ex parte proceeding, did reopen its apportionment
36. Id. at 241.
37. Ibid.
38. 245 La. 735, 161 So. 2d 63 (1964).
39. 52 Stat. 63 (1938), 7 U.S.C.A. § 1366 (1964).
40. 7 C.F.R. § 719.8(a) (2) (Supp. 1962).
41. 245 La. at 741, 742, 161 So. 2d at 64, 65; see also Chubb v. DeKeyzer
152 So. 2d 77, 81 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
42. 245 La. at 743, 161 So. 2d at 65-67.
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order and reallocate the allotment, and its revised apportion-
ment was affirmed by the statutory review committee."3 This
reopening of the Committee's initial ruling was under a regula-
tion providing that a farm must be reconstituted by the re-
combination of the different tracts into which it was divided
"whenever the farm was not properly constituted under the
applicable regulations in effect. at the time of the last constitu-
tion." 44 There was no time limitation placed on the county com-
mittee's reopening of its determination; the only limitation lay
in the requirement that the initial apportionment must have
been made of a farm "not properly constituted" under the regu-
latives then effective for cropland allotments.
45
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals proceeded on the as-
sumption that the initial ruling "may... be considered to have
been in error" but was unwilling to consider it as a "completely
void ruling. ' 46 However, since it was an administrative ruling,
the court hesitated to apply res judicata principles (even though
esteeming their appropriateness) in the face of a clear provi-
sion for reopening the apportionment ;47 indeed, since this was
still a direct attack on the order for mistake of law or fact,
there being no provision for its becoming final by failure to
appeal, it might also not even be susceptible to the application
of res judicata principles. 48
The Third Circuit seemed to reject also the possible applica-
tion of conventional estoppel principles, although there seemed
substantial basis for their application since the first purchaser
had bought the tract on the basis of the potential favorable
acreage for rice resulting from the first apportionment. 49 This
court preferred to put its holding upon "the presumption of
regularity [which] supports the official acts of public officers"
and that, consequently, "the county committee did not as a
matter of law have the right . . . to ignore and to rescind ex
parte the presumably-valid formal committee action [of earlier
date]."0 However, this court chose, "in summary," to array
other considerations as well in support of its holding, not least
43. Ibid.
44. 7 C.F.R. § 719.2(4) (1) (ii) 1964).
45. 245 La. at 744, 161 So. 2d at 66.
46. 152 So. 2d at 83.
47. Id. at 84.
48. 2 DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 18.09, at 606 (1958). -
49. 152 So. 2d at 84.
50. Ibid.
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of which being the fact that "private parties have substantially
changed their position in reliance upon the original administra-
tive ruling . .. as a result of which valuable property interests
are based upon the validity of such specific ruling."
51
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit but chose to
explore the issue of whether the farm was "properly constituted"
for the original apportionment.5 2 To do so, it was willing to
explore the fact issue of whether the tract retained was "avail-
able for rice planting" since the old owner "had surrendered all
allotments insofar as his acreage was concerned and had de-
clared his intention to, devote all that acreage exclusively to
cattle raising."' 5 3 This would; however, seem somewhat question-
begging since this was the allegedly erroneous interpretation
of "normally available" on whicl the seeond purchaser rested
his petition for reopening the original apportionment. 54 Per-
haps, however, this is no more than the court saying that the
original interpretation of "cropland normally ... available" was
correct in excluding acreage intended to be converted to other
uses, a holding which the Third Circuit was unwilling to make
but which was nonetheless clearly available to the court as a
"question of law" under the review provisions of the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act 5
The case underscores the desirability of being able to invoke
estoppel principles against a government agency ;56 perhaps it
is time for the United States Supreme Court to revise the prin-
ciple as expressed by it that "whatever the form in which the
Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement
with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascer-
tained that he who purports to act for the Government stays
within the bounds of his authority. 5 7
PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Peete v. Scheib5 8 underscores the difficulties encountered
when a civil service employee is suspended from his employ-
51. Ibid.
52. 245, La. at 744, 161 So. 2d at 66.
53. Id. at 746, 161 So. 2d at 66-67.
54. 152 So. 2d at. 81.
55. 52 Stat. 63 (1938), 7 U.S.C.A. § 1366 (1964).
56. See 2 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 17.09 (1958).
57. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947).
58. 156 So. 2d 280 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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ment while criminal charges are pending against him and
months or even years elapse before such charges are finally
disposed of. In this case, employee failed to appeal his suspen-
sion to the Civil Service Commission, citing as his reason "the
fact that criminal charges were still pending aginst him." 59
Some fifteen months later, employee accepted reinstatement
after he had been acquitted of the most serious charge, but at
a time when other charges were still outstanding. He then
waited to make his demand for wages lost until after the latter
charges had been nolle prosequied. The wage demand was re-
jected by the agency and the rejection upheld by the Civil Ser-
vice Commission on the ground that it was in effect a request
for a money judgment since made independently of an appeal
from a suspension or discharge. 60
In a mandamus proceeding, the Fourth Circuit upheld the
Civil Service Commission and reversed the trial court's action
in ordering the employing agency to pay. To uphold the trial
judge, reasoned the court, would be to usurp a function vested
in the Civil Service Commission, namely, "'the exclusive right
to hear and decide all appeals and the legality of all removal
and disciplinary cases.' "61 The court noted that, in these cir-
cumstances, "a ruling from the Civil Service Commission, in-
volving the legality or illegality of disciplinary action is a neces-
sary prerequisite to a mandamus proceeding and this conclusion
is fully supported by the rationale of the jurisprudence. 6 2
How then might the employee have proceeded in order to
save his right to litigate the issue of back pay? It would seem
to have required that he take a timely appeal from his reinstate-
ment without back pay since failure to restore wages lost as of
that time would have been in the nature of a sanction and its
legality could properly be passed upon by the Civil Service Com-
mission.63 This may not have been done because criminal charges
were still outstanding at this time. However, it would seem
that the commission proceedings could have been continued
pending the disposition of such charges; upon disposition, a
definitive order on the reinstatement with or without back
wages could be issued. If adverse to the applicant, a mandamus
59. Id. at 282.
60. Id. at 281.
61. Id. at 282.
62. Id. at 284.
63. LA CONST. art. XIV, § 15.1, paragraph 31.
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proceeding would presumably then lie without violating the
exclusive primary jurisdiction of the Commission. 64
DISCHARGES IN BANKRUPTCY
Melvin G. Dakin*
During last term, in Louisiana Machinery Co. v. Passman,'
the Third Circuit took the opportunity to reaffirm the jurispru-
dence on the effect of a discharge in bankruptcy on a duly sched-
uled claim on which suit had been brought and default judgment
taken after discharge. The litigation arose some ten years after
adjudication, in a suit to revive a judgment.2 The court quoted
approvingly that "the effect of the discharge on a judgment
against the bankrupt based on a provable claim is the same as
its effect on the claim itself ... the discharge will bar personal
enforcement of the judgment against the bankrupt, or against
any property of the bankrupt on which it was not a lien . . .
the reduction of such liability to a judgment does not change its
nature or character." 3
Here, since the original judgment could not be enforced
against the bankrupt, it followed that such a judgment, revived,
could not be enforced either.4 The fact that bankrupt permitted
the suit to go to judgment against him did not defeat his right
to interpose his discharge whenever the judgment was sought to
be enforced, whether immediately or ten years thereafter, as
in the instant suit.5
In Robinson v. Henderson,6 a bankrupt persuaded an asso-
ciate to sign a note with him as an accommodation maker. After
several payments on the note by the bankrupt, he filed a volun-
tary petition in bankruptcy but did not schedule the note as a
debt for which he was seeking discharge. In due course, a dis-
charge was granted to bankrupt, his assets were sold, the pro-
64. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1957-1958 Term -
Administrative Law, 19 LA. L. REv. 351, 352-53 (1959).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 158 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
2. Pursuant to LA. CODE OF Civir, PROCEDURE art. 2031 (1960).
3. 8B C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 563 (1963).
4. 158 So. 2d at 422.
5. Id. at 421.
6. 162 So. 2d 116 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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